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Perhaps the most striking characteristic of mine action in Yemen is the strong 
support it receives from the Government of Yemen. This support comes from the 
highest levels in Government and is evident in the legal and management framework 
that has been put into place, and in the day-to day activities of the Mine Action 
Centre itself. The Government signed the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention 
(sometimes called the Ottawa Treaty) in 1997 and ratified it in September 1998, the 
first country in the Middle East region to do so. It established a high-level National 
Mine Action Committee in 1998, chaired by a Minister of State who has direct access 
to the Prime Minister. The Mine Action Centre was set up in 1998, and is now 
managed by a dynamic strong leader. Yemen completed the first UN-certified 
Landmine Impact Survey in 2000, and shortly after developed a strategic plan for 
mine action that was subsequently updated and now covers the period 2004-2009. 
The Government managed to complete the destruction of its mine stockpile in April 
2002 and expects to fully comply with the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention 
(APMBC) by 2009. The seriousness of intent is also evident from the Government’s 
annual contribution to mine action amounting to some US$3.5 million, mainly 
covering salaries and allowances of more than 1,000 mine action workers. 
 
The evaluation team spent two weeks in Yemen and studied the outcomes of the 
UNDP programme activities, the on-going programme (both UNDP and nationally 
funded) in all its manifestations, and the prospects and needs for future UNDP 
support. Significant progress has been achieved in mine action. The Mine Action 
Centre has an organizational structure capable of addressing all components of a 
mine action programme.  Top leadership is strong and heads of units seem 
competent. A management succession strategy will need to be put in place, and 
management is very much aware of that.  There is scope for senior staff training, 
which has been hampered by, on the one hand, a lack of English language skills on 
the part of managers and, on the other hand, an absence of relevant courses in 
Arabic at Cranfield University. Some refresher training is necessary and the training 
of trainers at the National Training Centre would need to be fortified.  
 
The evaluation team considered standards, quality and operational issues. National 
standards are based on the International Mine Action Standards (IMAS), and those 
already produced are translated into Arabic. The latter version is said to contain 
elements that better reflect the national requirements of Yemen. To back up Quality 
Assurance, there is a comprehensive set of Standing Operating Procedures (SOPs) 
for all activities, including SOPs for Quality Assurance (QA) and monitoring. These 
have been translated into Arabic and are available at field level. A number of 
operational issues were considered and some recommendations are made in this 
report mostly to “fine tune” the system. Of grave concern to the evaluation team, 
however, is the relatively large stock of munitions stored in a residential area of 
Aden, awaiting explosives for destruction. The team strongly recommends that 
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donors be approached as a matter of urgency to donate sufficient explosive and 
demolition stores to destroy this dangerous stockpile by detonation. 
 
The team examined resource management issues. It recognized the vital importance 
of the role played by the UNDP, partly because UNDP involvement enhances 
transparency. In fact, donors interviewed confirmed the impression that the UNDP 
plays a crucial role in procurement, financial management and fund raising, and that 
any UNDP exit strategy with respect to those areas would, at this time, be ill 
considered. 
 
A very promising start has been made with the establishment of Mine Detection Dog 
capability, including a small breeding programme. The dogs are used for mine 
clearance, technical survey (area reduction), and quality assurance. A chief instructor 
and his crew from the Afghan Mine Dog School in Kabul conduct dog training. Both 
the training programme and the breeding programme are commendable. A few 
suggestions are made in this report to enhance operations. 
 
The mine action programme includes two high profile components; Mine Risk 
Education (MRE) and Victim Assistance (VA); both of excellent quality. MRE enjoys 
the full support from the highest levels of government and is dynamic and well 
organized. VA consists of a number of phases: survey, medical examination, medical 
support, and rehabilitation. This last phase includes training of victims and supporting 
them to re-integrate into their communities. Both programmes rank among the best in 
the world. 
 
The Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA) manages to produce 
useful information that is effective for mine action planning purposes. The underlying 
GIS maps of 1:100,000, however, should ideally be changed to 1:50,000. The system 
should also be customized to allow details of MRE and VA programmes to be 
included.  Cooperation between Operations and IMSMA should be improved in order 
to enhance accuracy. 
 
Considering that the victims of mine action are not only individuals, but also 
communities as organic entities, the evaluation team discussed the need for socio-
economic recuperation with various respondents. There was general sympathy for 
the idea to introduce a sixth pillar of mine action, (i.e. post-clearance community 
rehabilitation). Post-clearance assessments, combined with pre-feasibility studies for 
community development, may give rise to initiatives that could be included in national 
development plans and/or become integral parts of relevant donor projects.  The 
evaluation team recommends that this sixth pillar be introduced into the YEMAC. It 
would require an enhancement of orientation in the Chief Technical Advisor’s (CTA) 
traditional mandate, the appointment of a highly qualified counterpart, and 
collaboration with the UNDP, bilateral donors and relevant Government departments. 
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During the last 30 years, Yemen has suffered from a number of conflicts, each 
leaving behind significant landmine and UXO contamination.1 Yemen started its mine 
action programme in 1998 with the establishment of a management structure that 
included a National Mine Action Committee (NMAC) to provide guidance at the 
highest Government level, an Executive Mine Action Centre (EMAC) to carry out the 
mine action programme, and a regional mine action branch in Aden.2   
 
A nation-wide landmine impact survey (LIS) was conducted that started in July 1999 
and was UN certified a year later. The survey showed that 592 communities were 
affected by landmines and UXO, 14 of which were highly impacted (population of 
about 36,000) with the remainder having medium and low contamination (population 
of about 790,000). There was significant suffering in terms of socio-economic 
deprivation, and casualties were numerous. It was estimated that some 5,000 
casualties had occurred during the previous ten years, 200 of which during the 
previous two years (1998/99). Reports of casualties continue with regularity. 
 
During the first phase of the UNDP-supported programme (1999-2003), which was 
executed by UNOPS, significant progress was made in all areas of mine action, 
including Mine Risk Education (MRE), Victim Assistance (VA), surveying  and, last 
but not least, land clearance. The seriousness of intent of the Government can be 
judged from various indicators. Of crucial importance is the government structure that 
has been created in support of mine action.  Contributions made by the Government 
(especially the salaries and allowances of staff) amount to more than US$3 million a 
year. The various decrees by the Prime Minister and the Minister of State (Chairman 
of NMAC) provided a necessary legal framework for action. Mine action is of very 
high priority for the Government of Yemen.  Numerous donors contributed to the 
programme either through the aegis of the UNDP (Japan, Norway, USA, Germany, 
UK, Canada, Sweden, Netherlands, Saudi Arabia,, Switzerland and Italy) or directly 
to the NMAC (Kingdom of Saudi Arabia). Total contributions received during the first 
phase amounted to US$ 4,255,788, including direct contributions from the UNDP as 
well contributions from the Government of Yemen (which were in addition to the more 
than US$3 million annually mentioned earlier). 
 
A second phase, also supported by UNDP (Project number YEM/03/010/01/99) 
started in October 2003. Its overriding goal is to further strengthen national capacity 
for mine action in the country. One of the key accomplishments has been the drafting 
and acceptance of a revised five-year National Strategic Mine Action Plan for Yemen, 
2004-2009. During this period, the Government is committed to achieving mine-
 
1 The conflicts were: 1962-75 the war between republicans and royalists in the North; 1963-1967 the war of 
independence in the South; 1970-83 the leftist guerrilla war in the central provinces; and 1994 the unification 
war. 
2 A second branch was subsequently opened in Mukalla in 2003 
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impact free status, another important milestone on the road to full compliance with 
the Anti Personnel Mine Ban Convention (APMBC).3  
 
This mid-term evaluation of Project number YEM/03/010/01/99 is an attempt to 
identify the strengths and weaknesses of the management and execution of mine 
action in Yemen. The terms of reference for the evaluation appear in Annex 1. The 
methodology used is results-based; specifically results in terms of outputs and 
outcomes. The approach is in line with the Results Based Management (RBM) 
monitoring and evaluation methodology adopted by the UNDP. The report discusses 
a logical progression of output/outcome indicators and provides analytical sections 
identifying interrelationships among outcomes. It provides an Executive Summary 





3 In April 2002, the destruction of the national stockpile of anti-personnel mines took place, thus fulfilling one of 
the important commitments under the APMBC. 
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The first phase of mine action in Yemen had been satisfactorily completed in the fall 
of 2003 with significant achievements in, inter alia: the completion of a UN certified 
Landmine Impact Survey (LIS); training and creation of mine clearance teams, 
technical survey teams and quality assurance teams; clearance of six highly 
impacted communities; introduction of an effective Mine Risk Education (MRE) 
programme; and the establishment of a Victim Assistance (VA) programme. The 
second phase was to continue to strengthen national capacity for mine action in 
Yemen, no longer with the support of UNOPS but through national execution. The 
mid-term evaluation of this second phase, therefore, will have to focus, in essence, 
on the achievements made by the Government in establishing sustainability in 
national mine action.  
 
The methodology applied to this mid-term evaluation derives directly from the 
Results-Based Management (RBM) approach, which has been fully embraced by the 
UNDP. Based on the terms of reference, an evaluation matrix has been prepared 
identifying key outputs and their respective indicators. The latter may involve, in 
specific cases, first level outcomes. The matrix appears as Annex 2. 
 
While RBM introduces a desirable level of discipline into the task, the evaluation 
team felt it necessary to elaborate not only on indicators, but also on the 
interconnections that exist among programme elements. This more analytical task 
can provide useful insights leading to certain strategic management 
recommendations. An example is the need to look at the continuing role of the UNDP 
in the programme, or the logical evolution of a mine action programme once the 
traditional elements have been completed or are nearing completion. 
 
The evaluation team consisted of two specialists, one skilled in the technicalities of 
the various elements of mine action, the other focusing on management aspects. The 
team commenced on 9 April 2005, and completed its investigative work in Yemen 
two weeks later. Work consisted of interviews (see Annex 3 for a list of people 
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3 Management Aspects  
 
3.1 The structure of the Yemeni National Mine Action Programme (YMAP) 
appears remarkably well developed, and contains all the components necessary for a 
well-managed enterprise. Among the elements in place are the following 
components: 
 
• A national decree, which was signed in June 1998, establishing both the 
National Mine Action Committee and the Yemen Executive Mine Action Centre 
as legal entities.  This has been amended and kept up to date. 
 
• A high-level National Mine Action Committee, which was set up in June 1998.  
It is chaired now (he is the fourth Minister with this responsibility) by Kasem 
Ahmed Al-Agam, a Minister of State and member of Cabinet. This means that 
mine action is coordinated at Ministerial level, with direct access to the 
President through the Prime Minister.  The Committee includes the deputies of 
nine ministries, which is an excellent way of ensuring that the needs of all 
relevant Ministries are kept under review.   
 
• A Yemeni Executive Mine Action Centre (YEMAC), which was set up in 
January 1999 to implement the plans and policies approved by the National 
Mine Action Committee. This is the main controlling agency for mine action in 
Yemen, and is involved with all aspects of mine action including Mine Risk 
Education (MRE) and Victim Assistance (VA) Programmes.  
 
• A nation-wide Landmine Impact Survey (LIS), carried out in the year 1999-
2000, which has given a clear picture of the national contamination.  This LIS 
was carried out by the Survey Action Centre, and identified some 592 mine-
affected communities in 95 districts, and 1,078 contaminated areas.  The main 
casualties were among farmers, nomadic herdsmen, and their children. 
 
• A National Strategy Paper, which was drafted in 2001 based on the LIS, 
initially covered 2001-2005 but has now been extended to cover the period 
2004 to 2009, by which time it is estimated that the country will be free of the 
effects of anti-personnel mines, an important milestone on the road to full 
compliance with requirements of the Mine Ban Treaty, which Yemen has 
signed and ratified.   
 
• National Mine Action Standards (NMAS), based on the UN International Mine 
Action Standards (IMAS), which are now in preparation, but many of which 
have already been drafted and translated into Arabic. 
 
• A comprehensive set of generic Standing Operating Procedures (SOPs), 
specially prepared for mine action in Yemen.  These SOPs have also been 
translated into Arabic. 
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• The signing of the Mine Ban Convention (AP MBC) in 1997, and ratification in 
1998.  Yemen was the first country in the Middle East Region to do so.  
 
• The destruction of the national stockpile of AP landmines in April 2002.  
 
3.2 This is extremely encouraging, and means that the Republic of Yemen has 
built up a solid legal and structural foundation to their mine action programme, an 
achievement that many other longer-lived national programmes have failed to 
produce. 
 
3.3 It is also notable that although the mine action programme uses officers and 
soldiers for its mine action teams, the Programme Manager is not a serving officer, 
the teams do not wear military uniforms, and the mine action programme is not run 
by the Defence Ministry, although the staff members receive military salaries. This 
separation from serving army staff works well, and allows donors to fund the 
programme, since they do not have to fund salaries.    
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4 Overview of Progress Achieved 
 
The Yemeni Programme has made significant strides since 1999.  Some of the 
achievements are: 
 
• The Programme is ranked in the top 20 UN-supported Mine Action 
Programmes worldwide.  It was in the top 3 of the 16 programmes seen by the 
evaluation team. 
• The LIS was the first UN-certified Landmine Impact Survey.  
• The programme has successfully met its strategic targets for 2001, 2002, 
2003, and 2004. 
• It has created and trained eight mine clearance units, seven Technical Survey 
teams, three Quality Assurance teams, and one monitoring and evaluation 
team, with a total staff of over 1,000 people. 
• It has built up a Mine Detection Dog (MDD) capability. 
• It has cleared 10 of its 14 highly impacted communities, and the clearance of 
four others is expected to be completed by the fall of 2005. 
• The Governorate of Aden, once a heavily contaminated area, is now free from 
landmines. 
• Over 218 million m2 have been surveyed and cleared of landmines and UXOs. 
• Over 181,000 mines and UXOs have been discovered and destroyed. 
• Over 450,000 people have received Mine Risk Education (MRE) in 266 
villages. 
• Over 1,100 victims have been medically checked and treated. 
• Yemen is on track to fulfil its Mine Ban Convention commitments by March 
2009. 
 
4.1 Strategic planning capability. 
 
4.1.1 Ideally, strategic planning should be done by the National Mine Action 
Committee, but in reality the strategic plans are drafted by the YEMAC, for 
submission to the Committee for approval.  This is common in many national 
programmes.  The Strategy Plan aims to rid the Republic of Yemen of the 
effects of landmines by 2009. This is a practical possibility provided that no 
further major mined areas are found which were not identified in the Local 
Impact Survey, which is unlikely. It may also be difficult to achieve due to 
slippage in donor funding. 
 
4.1.2 The five-year strategy plan represents the Yemeni government’s Mine Action 
Programme Plan,  and was based on the initial five year strategy plan 2001-
2005, mentioned above. Apparently it was drafted by the CTA in close 
consultation with the Programme Manager. This is not seen as a problem 
because the Programme Manager could use the existing plan as a guide to 
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In summary, the Yemeni Government has a functional and practical strategic 
capacity, which will be easy to modify. It also has the capability to carry out such 
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5 Implementing Support for the 
structure – YEMAC and its Staff 
 
5.1 The YEMAC is a well set up organisation, which is entirely national except for 
an expatriate CTA and Programme Adviser. It has a headquarters in Sana’a and 
regional offices in Aden and Mukalla (Hadramaut). The headquarters has sections 
devoted to operations, planning (including IMSMA), training, Finance and Logistics, 
Mine Risk Education (MRE) and Victim Assistance (VA).  The majority of the staff 
interviewed seem competent, and their work appears to be effective.  The MRE and 
VA sections are well integrated into the structure, and almost uniquely well 
organised, mainly due to initiatives from the Programme Manager.  The mine and 
UXO clearance operations are undertaken by eight clearance companies, assisted 
by seven survey teams, one of each working with the Regional Centre in Mukalla, 
covering the distributed smaller mined areas in the east of the country. With the three 
Quality Assurance (QA) teams, the monitoring team and the MDD capacity 
mentioned above, YEMAC has all the necessary component parts for a highly 
effective mine action centre.  The total staff complement is 1014, with 25 per cent at 
Headquarters and the remainder in the field, which represent reasonable numbers in 
a programme of this size. 
 
5.2 The National Programme Manager is a powerful and hardworking man, with 
many original ideas, high motivation and strength of purpose. His supporting staff 
members appear to vary in quality, and to some extent seem to look to the 
Programme Manager for guidance. The Programme Manager is trying to achieve 
more delegation of responsibility. He is also trying to get junior staff members to 
expand in capability, and to feel comfortable with acceptance of responsibility.  The 
problem is that many of the better staff speak only Arabic, which means they cannot 
work directly with some donors, nor attend the higher-level management courses.  
The inability to operate in a mixed language environment creates difficulties, which 
the Programme Manager is facing.  This situation meets the present requirements, 
because expatriate technical advisers provide a valuable source of advice and 
information at all levels.  When UNDP draws down its level of support, and expatriate 
staff members are removed, the overall reliance on the one high profile manager will 
increase. In the opinion of the evaluation team, the programme Manager is so 
capable, and with such a high profile at Ministerial level, that it is likely he will be 
promoted to another appointment, in mine action or outside it, either in Yemen or 
internationally.  Without a strong and well-trained team to take over, YEMAC could 
suffer after his departure, but he is aware that it is his responsibility to ensure that 
such a team is available before he leaves his present post.   
 
Lesson Learned 1 
The success of Yemen’s mine action programme is largely due to the very 
strong commitment coming from the highest levels of Government, translated 
into a powerful decision-making structure and competent management. 
 
 
  9  
 
             
 
 
6 Standards, Quality, and 
Operational Issues 
 
6.1 National Standards 
 
1 National Mine Action Standards are in production, based on International Mine 
Action Standards (IMAS), and those already produced have been translated into 
Arabic.  Although the English originals have relied heavily on IMAS, the Arabic 
version is said to contain elements that better reflect the national requirements of 
Yemen.  Copies of these standards are available in the YEMAC.   
 
Recommendation 1 
It is recommended that the Yemeni National Mine Action Standards be retained 
in the GICHD for use as a working example for other Arabic-speaking national 
programmes.   
 
6.2 Quality Assurance System 
 
1 There is a Quality Assurance (QA) section in the YEMAC, but no Quality 
Manager as such, this duty being undertaken by the man in charge of the Quality 
Assurance teams. To back the QA, there is a comprehensive set of SOPs for all 
activities, including SOPs for QA and monitoring, which lay down the criteria required 
and the methods of achieving the required results. These have been translated into 
Arabic, and are available at field level. The Company Commander of 7 Company 
appeared to have the most important factors listed beside the operations map in his 
field-briefing site, and these were apparently read out to all team members on a daily 
basis, which is a practical way of passing on this knowledge. 
 
(Quality assurance at field level is discussed under operations below.)   
6.3 Operational Issues 
 
1 Clearance operations 
 
1.1 Operational clearance issues.   
 
i. In the limited time available, it was only possible to visit one working mine 
clearance site.  This was in Khanfar District of the Abyan Governorate, not far 
from the Aden Regional base.  No 7 company, with three teams, was clearing 
a site previously cleared by the Yemeni Army, but it was apparently policy to 
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re-clear all Army-cleared sites, and three anti-tank mines have already been 
found in the area.  The clearance area was 104,022m2.  Clearance started on 
27 November, and 34,800m2 have already been completed up to the end of 
March 2005.  
 
ii. The clearance methods were conventional, using the Ebinger 421 mine 
detector and hand prodding. The mine detectors and hand tools seemed to be 
in good condition and the tool kit checked appeared complete. The operating 
system used was one man per lane, but the man was replaced after 30 
minutes, and rested until the next changeover point, a necessary factor in hot 
weather. The work was slow, due to a high level of metallic scrap and 
fragments in the area, none of which had been removed by the previous 
clearance. Working hours were from 05.00 to a finish time varying between 
11.00 and 13.00, depending on the temperature and conditions, which 
appeared operationally sensible. 
  
iii. Post-clearance checking.  Due to distances of minefields from main roads and 
shortage of time, one cleared area was examined which had been returned to 
the local community. The occasion of the visit was used for the presentation of 
certificates from YEMAC thanking the local people for their support and 
cooperation, and a small group of local people was present to receive them.  
The minefield had been on a ridge near Al Masharih in the A’adain Sada’a 
district. This ridge, though not cultivated, lay across the quickest 
communication route for all the fifteen villages in this area, and was used for 
the movement of livestock. The area of the minefield was about 37,500 m2.  
Eleven PMN anti-personnel mines were found and destroyed by No. 7 
Company. The fifteen villages in the area were said to contain about 30 
families in each, so perhaps about 2,500 people benefited, and three to five 
times than number of livestock, since herds are moved to gain food from the 
shrubs and bushes in the area. 
 
1.2 Future Operational Needs.   
 
1 At the moment, there appear to be enough clearance resources to deal with 
the medium impact area identified by the LIS.  It is however noted that the numbers 
of mines found is small, and they are not in patterned minefields.  Experience in other 
national programmes has shown that increased use of Technical Survey techniques 
can increase the areas of land released by a significant factor, especially if dogs can 
be used to detect the actual mines or mined areas in a suspected area.  There has 
been a decision that at least two clearance units should be converted for Technical 
Survey, and the results should be assessed at the end of a twelve-month period.  
This should be possible within the skills and equipment holdings of YEMAC.  
 
2. Based on the extended strategic plan, YEMAC plans to restructure all its 
clearance units to smaller logistically independent platoons and introduce one man 
one lane drill to increase clearance outputs as well as safety. This results from 
experience that most of the minefields are small in size and a full Demining unit (54 
deminers) cannot be employed at the same time. Also YEMAC plans to establish an 
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additional seven technical survey teams and two quality assurance teams. However, 
these plans are awaiting funding or in-kind contribution of equipment and if YEMAC 
could not secure funding/equipment to do so, there could be delay in meeting the 
convention’s objective by March 2009.   
 
Recommendation 2 
It is recommended that the plan to convert two clearance teams to Technical 
Survey be implemented as soon as possible. 
 
2 Safety issues 
 
i. All clearance staff was wearing PPE, which appeared to be in good condition 
except for two visors, which were scratched.  Soft visor bags were available. 
 
ii. When mines were found, they were stored until they could be defused by a 
special EOD destruction team.  Although this was contrary to IMAS, it was 
necessary due to the shortage of explosive demolition stores for mine destruction.  
 
iii. UXO found during clearance were similarly stored, and the Aden Regional 
Mine Action Branch has accumulated a large stock of munitions, some in a 
potentially dangerous state.  This is an unsafe practice, because the munitions 
are stored in a residential area in Aden, and a munitions fire or explosion could 
cause great damage to the surrounding district, as happened in Lagos, Nigeria. 
The problem is well known to the Programme Manager, but until explosives and 
demolition stores can be purchased, the munitions have to remain in situ in a 
guarded building.  
 
Recommendation 3 
It is recommended that enquires be made to explore the possibility of reducing 
the munitions stock by open burning techniques.   
 
Recommendation 4 
It is also strongly recommended that donors be requested as a matter of 
urgency to donate sufficient explosive and demolition stores to destroy this 
dangerous stockpile by detonation, a safer alternative to burning.   
 
iv. There have been four accidents since 2002, resulting in one death and three 
seriously injured staff members. A Board of Inquiry was held in each case. These 
accidents were unfortunate, but understandable given the very difficult terrain in 
the mountain areas of Yemen. 
 
3. Quality Issues 
 
i. The first level of quality assurance is provided by the Team Leader, who 
monitors the performance of his team to ensure compliance with SOPs, and 
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carries out sampling of his own team. This is required by the Company 
Commander, and is the only internal form of QA. It is supported by the periodic 
and random visit of a two-man QA team, of which there are two in the Aden 
Region and one in Mukalla. These teams usually operate after the demining 
teams have left the worksite, and they carry out a sample clearance of up to 10% 
or more. Their effectiveness has been proved by the finding of two missed mines 
to date. There is also a single two-man independent monitoring team, which visits 
field sites to check compliance with SOPs and national standards.  
   
ii. The above is a system that is unique to Yemen, but appears to work. The 
effectiveness of monitoring teams is measured by the follow-up action taken by 
the inspected teams, and it is to be hoped that this will be immediate and 
systematic, which it is not in some other national programmes.   
 
Recommendation 5 
Since there are three teams in a Company, it is recommended that (where 
possible) team leaders perform QA sampling on each other’s teams rather than 
on their own, which can add to the thoroughness of the sampling process. 
    
4 Medical issues 
 
The doctor was in attendance, with an ambulance, which was fitted with radio for 
medical and casualty evacuation communications only.  The medical kit was 
checked, and seemed unusually complete.  The doctor estimated that the transit time 
to get a casualty to Aden hospital was about 50 minutes, and that the Aden hospital 
has the capability to carry out neurological surgery. 
 
5 Communications issues  
 
Communications were by VHF on site, and all team leaders and commanders 
seemed to be in possession of hand-held radios.  In addition, there was HF 
communication to base, where the operations room were on listening watch 
throughout working hours.  Mobile telephones are frequently used as alternative 
means of communication, but in the particular area visited, while possible, the signal 
was weak.  The internet has become the communications means of choice for many 
organisations, including the UN, UNDP, the GICHD, Cranfield and James Madison 
University, all of whom provide a great deal of relevant information on topics and 
trends in mine action.   
 
Recommendation 6 
It is recommended that Company Commanders, Team Leaders and members of 
YEMAC and the National Training Centre be encouraged to use internet for 
educational purposes. The Programme Manager is introducing a pilot scheme 
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6 Environmental issues   
 
In the area visited, mechanical clearance could not be used without severe damage 
to the bushes in the area, which are the food supply for the local nomadic herds.  
This meant that manual clearance had to be used.  Bushes were burned off before 
mine and UXO clearance, but this promotes re-growth.   In addition, the area being 
burned off is minimal compared to the surrounding area, and has little effect on the 
local pasture.  As a matter of policy, it was stated that the minimum possible damage 
is done to the soil. 
 
7 Logistic support to operations 
 
There appeared to be an effective manually-based logistic system in place, with 
reasonable safeguards for cost-effectiveness, including the use of three bids for each 
purchase, and money for equipment over US$2,500 being handled by UNDP rather 
than YEMAC.  The stores vouchers seemed to be in order, and expensive items 
were signed for by individual users.  There were some safeguards against over-
purchase of expendable items such as batteries and motor vehicle tyres.  The main 
problems derived from slowness in payment of purchase orders by UNDP, leading to 
cancellation of orders by vendors, and loss of credibility by the YEMAC purchasing 
staff.  The stores inventory and purchasing, has not been computerised, although this 
is planned in the National Action Plan for 2005. There has also been lack of sufficient 
funding for some medical supplies to treat minor illnesses in the field, and on 
occasions there is insufficient funding to provide desired levels of equipment 
replacement at some stages in the programme. 
 
8 Transport support to operations 
 
The transport documentation and logistic system seemed to be satisfactory, although 
parts of that would also benefit from computerisation.  All vehicles use work tickets, 
recording times and distances and fuels used.  Receipts for fuels were checked 
against works tickets and retained.  There was a system of documentation for 
maintenance and repair.  There was an extensive vehicle repair capability in Aden, 
with a reasonable supply of spare parts for all vehicles. 
 
Recommendation 7 
It is recommended that donors be asked to fund the computerised system of 
stores and inventory management planned in the 2005 National Action Plan, 
and the training necessary for the logistic staff.  
 
Recommendation 8 
It is also recommended that the German Foreign Ministry be asked to supply 




  14  
 
             
 
 




1 Basic training is carried out at the National Training Centre in Aden.  This is a 
large facility with good equipment, and sufficient room to run four classes 
simultaneously.  Recruits are only accepted for training after a rigorous physical 
check, and screening to ensure their motivation to undertake mine action.   They also 
have to be fully literate.  The course itself was stated to be about 10 weeks in length, 
which is long for such training.  70% of the instruction is field training.  Subjects 
covered include use and care of all hand tools, use of electronic detectors and 
prodders, mine and UXO types, basic safety drills, first aid and MRE.  The only 
subject deliberately omitted is demolition and destruction of mines and UXO, to 
ensure that explosive demolition is restricted to EOD teams, who have the most 
experience in this area.  It also means that less staff has access to explosive, a valid 
security precaution.  
 
2 The last two weeks of the course are spent on practical tests, and the recruit 
must pass all these tests before being allocated a place in a mine clearance team.  
Once in the field, they are closely supervised for one week, not only on their mine 
action capability but also their ability to live under field conditions.  If the recruits fail 
the tests, some parts of the course can be covered again.  Their early performance is 
assessed by risk evaluation officers, who can finally decide whether the recruit is 
accepted or not.  This sounds to be a comprehensive training course, which should 
ensure that the mine clearance staff is adequately trained for their duties.   
 
3 Basic UXO and demolition courses are also carried out at the National 
Training Centre.  There was not time to discuss this course in detail. 
 
4 Much of the training material has been updated by the Programme Adviser, 
who has provided training materials on ERW recognition, manual demining and 
demolition procedures, translated into Arabic.  He has also updated the existing 
course material for Impact Survey training, Technical Survey, Quality Control, training 
of trainers and mine dog training. 
 
5 It was claimed that refresher training takes place in two periods every year 
after return from leave, but this is left to the Company Commanders, and may not 
always happen.  
 
Recommendation 9 
It is recommended that a 3-day refresher-training course be designed and put 
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Team Leader training 
 
This training course lasts 30 days, and was carried out by trainers from RONCO.  It 
would be preferable if such courses were carried out by YEMAC instructors.  The 
RONCO initiative was welcomed, but YEMAC training would be preferable. 
   
Mine Action Training delivered at both senior and middle level 
 
Since the majority of staff members in senior and middle management positions have 
been mine clearance staff in the past, the need for refresher training in mine action 
may not be needed.   
 
Recommendation 10 
Where staff is recruited direct from the Army, refresher training, and a 
reasonable period in the field, are highly recommended.   
 
Recommendation 11 
It is also recommended that administrative and logistics staff members spend 
a short attachment in the field, to ensure that they understand the problems at 
field level.   
 
Staff Training system for YEMAC  
 
1 Three senior staff members were selected for senior management training at 
Cranfield University, one each in 2000, 2002 and 2003.  Two were selected for 
middle management training in Jordan in 2002.  More senior staff members need this 
training, but cannot gain benefit from it while the training is conducted in English.  
 
Recommendation 12 
It is recommended that Cranfield University be asked to conduct their next 
regional middle management course in Arabic, and give priority to Yemeni 
candidates.   
 
2 It is a fact that English is the most commonly used language in the mine action 
area, and both the UN and the GICHD use this as their working language.   
 
Recommendation 13 
It is recommended that middle and senior managers be given instruction in 
English, so they can benefit more from training material and other information 
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Training of Trainers  
 
1 The training of trainers was done by the senior staff, all of whom were 
academically qualified engineers, with long experience of mine action.  The courses 
varied in length, due to the capabilities and experience of the staff being trained.  
This was done at the National Training Centre in Aden.  It was stated that there were 
sufficient trainers for their needs.  The subjects covered in the instruction for trainers 
included all SOPs and standards, and the activities of all sections of mine action. 
 
2 The National Training Centre was recently evaluated by an education expert 
from Sana’a University, when many recommendations were made.  One of the 
shortcomings noted was the absence of computers and projectors for Power Point, 
which is a useful instructional tool for lesson plans.    
 
Recommendation 14 
It is recommended that computer equipment, projectors and training in Power 
Point be given to the instructors at the National Training Centre.   
 
Recommendation 15 
It is also recommended that trainers be periodically rotated into field positions 
as Team Leaders or Supervisors in field companies, quality control or survey 
teams, to allow them to gain valuable feedback from the operations.  This will 
give them a better idea of areas where current training may be insufficient. 
 
3 The National Training Centre also carries out specialist training as necessary, 
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8 Resource Management 
 




1.1 Mobilization of donors’ resources follows a system that can be conveniently 
summarized as follows. 
 
• Resource requirements are, in first instance, based on a long-term mine 
action strategy. A five year National Strategic Mine Action Plan for Yemen, 
2004-2009 (revised and extended) has been drafted. It was approved by the 
Government of Yemen in 2004. It contains strategic goals and objectives (the 
key one being completion of the MA programme in 2009) and indicates 
resources required each year; 
 
• An annual work plan is prepared, with costing for each component. It is 
incorporated into the UN Atlas financial system following pre-determined 
categories; 
 
• Annual work plans from all mine action programs are collected into the 
Global Portfolio, coordinated by UNMAS. The latter constitutes a basis for 
funding options donors can choose from; 
 
• YEMAC prepares a monthly update for each project, which is sent to 
UNMAS with indications of funds, pledged and received and funds still 
required. 
 
• Concurrently, YEMAC has an annual meeting with donors collectively and 
individually in Sana’a. Individual donors are approached for specific project 
financing. 
 
• The Programme Manager of YEMAC, together with the Chairman of NMAC 
travel to donor countries to follow-up on expressed interest.  
 
• Contributing donors transfer funds to the UNDP BCPR Thematic Trust 
Fund (TTF) in New York. Authorization to draw funds is then forwarded to the 
UNDP Country Office in Yemen. 
 
1.2  In addition to contributions to the TTF, there are other ways of contributing, 
such as: 
 
• Bilateral arrangements between the Government of Yemen and a donor 
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• Bilateral cost-sharing agreements with the UNDP, for general or specific  
purposes. 
 
• In-kind contributions, (e.g. USA, Germany and Switzerland) 
 
1.3  The external resource mobilization system provides options for donors 
depending on preferences and, thus far, seems to have worked well. The system 
allows for a maximum of flexibility and offers various options in the pursuit of 
transparency. So far there have been no budgetary shortfalls.  
 
1.4  While there is an acceptable process of informing donors with respect to 
resource requirements, there appears to be some room for improvement in progress 
reporting to stakeholders. At the moment, donors receive progress feedback on the 
basis of reporting frequency and content, stipulated in the respective contribution 
agreements. It may be worth considering the preparation of periodic updates on the 
YEMAC programme as a whole, thus complementing the existing website. Through 




It is recommended that quarterly updates on the overall YEMAC programme be 
prepared for distribution to stakeholders.  
 
2 Procurement  
 
2.1  With the change in the execution modality of the UNDP support project to the 
national mine action programme from agency to national execution in the fall of 2003, 
procurement responsibilities changed and fell upon the shoulders of YEMAC. 
Controls were required and an agreement was concluded establishing a procurement 
system for purchases of $2,500 or below, and purchases over $2,500. Payment for 
purchases falling under the lower limit are made directly by the UNDP to the vendor, 
on the basis of quotes, invoices and receipts. The control of this system seems to 
work satisfactorily. 
 
2.2  An advance system has been introduced whereby $100,000 is advanced each 
quarter against which purchases can be made. At the end of the quarter the advance 
is reconciled and left over funds go towards to advance for the next quarter. The 
purchase verification system (examination of purchase documents, spot price 
checks) seems adequate. However, it would be appropriate for the YEMAC finance 
officer to be allowed to perform periodic field checks for additional controls.   
 
2.3  With respect to procurement above the $2,500 limit, YEMAC provides a 
service request to the UNDP Country Office. At that point, procurement follows 
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Recommendation 17 
It is recommended that a system of periodic field verification checks by 
YEMAC’s finance officer be introduced.  
 
3 Trials in Support of Procurement 
 
3.1  There was no evidence of a systematic test and trial capacity at YEMAC, 
although some tests had apparently taken place on different types of mine detectors 
before accepting the Ebinger as the working instrument.  In reality, there is no need 
for large-scale tests of equipment, since the companies have equipment that appear 
adequate for their purposes except for extreme conditions such as detection 
problems in areas of highly metallic rock, and removal of mines from deep sand.  
There is almost no mechanical clearance, but the Programme Manager has selected 
some new types of mechanical equipment, and trials on these will be conducted in 
Yemen.  There appear to be no SOPs for equipment trials, but this is not uncommon 
in small national programmes.  Unfortunately the soil characteristics in Yemen are so 
different from those in Europe and SE Asia that test results from systematic trials 
done in Croatia and Cambodia would have little relevance.  The GICHD Equipment 
Manual was available in YEMAC. There have been several mine detectors trials and 
there is at least a national standard available on this and the programme personnel 
are fully trained on equipment test and conduct of trials. Senior YEMAC personnel 
(Director, Director of NTC, Director of RMAB Aden and CTA, OPA etc.) participated 
in the last detector trials.  
 
3.2  In other programmes, the mine action centre has used a combination of the 
CTA, local staff and external assistance to set up ad-hoc trials.  If trials were needed, 
this would be the recommended solution rather than establishing an expensive trials 
capability in a small national programme.  
 
4  Budgetary Contributions 
 
4.1  The resource mobilization system has resulted in external contributions 
sufficient to meet budgetary requirements. The overall financial summary of the mine 
action project is provided in Annex 4. Thus far, for the year 2005, some $1.5 million 
has been mobilized leaving about $2 million still to be found. The year 2005 
represents the peak of required funds for the execution of a mature programme, 
tapering down in the ensuing years towards completion in 2009. 
 
4.2  As mentioned earlier, one of the very noteworthy aspects of the mine action 
programme in Yemen is the strong commitment by the Government. This is 
expressed, among other things, in the financial contribution the Government makes 
each year, estimated to be the equivalent of about $3.5 million. It is difficult to 
calculate the precise monetary value of this contribution, but the table in Annex 5 
prepared by the YEMAC advisory team, provides a rather accurate indication. The 
table shows that for the year 2004, some $3.5 million equivalent was contributed by 
GOY, some $2.9 million of which went for salaries and allowances of slightly more 
than 1000 demining personnel.  
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9 Mine Detection Dogs 
 
 
1 The YEMAC has established a Mine Detection Dog capability, including a 
small breeding programme.  The dogs are used for mine clearance, for technical 
survey (area reduction) and for Quality Assurance, and produce an output that is said 
to be many times faster than manual clearance.  During the visit, it was only possible 
to visit the training site, and not the kennel area.  The school was set up with the 
assistance of the Afghan MDD programme, and the chief instructor was on 
secondment from the Afghan Mine Dog School in Kabul, but the aim is to replace him 
with a Yemeni instructor. 
 
2 The total number of dogs is 38 (about one tenth of the Afghan programme), 
with a further eight puppies under training.  This number is sufficient for current 
operations, but may have be expanded if there is a change in the pattern of 
clearance operations towards increased technical survey, which usually involves 
search by dogs.   
 
3 Dogs and handlers received periodic refresher training, including daily checks.  
The training area was located in a military camp, which ensured that the place was 
guarded.  There was a wide area for training, but the fenced test area was relatively 
small, but well laid out.  During the demonstration of search on a long leash, the 
search dog was a little erratic, but this may have been due to the large audience 
putting stress on the dog and handler.  Another search area used actual mines 
outside the fenced area.  In general, the use of such a search area means that the 
mines have to be placed shortly before the search, which can lead to the dog 
identifying the disturbed soil rather than the mine.  Some other form of targets should 
be selected, which do not require secure guarding.   
 
4 The breeding programme is commendable, since locally bred dogs are 
cheaper, easier to train and suffer less from local diseases and pests, but the number 
of puppies is small, and will barely cover wastage through age.   
 
5 The main problems were: 
 
• The training area is some distance from the kennels, which means that the 
dogs have to be transported by truck on a daily basis.  
 
• The smallness of the test site, which has to be used repeatedly, allowing the 
site to become contaminated with dog smells, and the dogs and handlers to 
know where to look for the mines. 
 
• The use of a military training area makes it difficult to expand with the 
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6 Altogether, it seemed to be a commendable small programme, which could act 
as a model for other national programmes.  Regrettably, the conditions in the only 
active clearance site visited in the Abyan Governorate were not conducive to the use 
of dogs, being dry and sandy, with a surface wind.  
 
Recommendation 18 
It is recommended that a senior instructor from the Afghan MDD programme 
remain with the Yemeni dog programme, to allow improvements to be passed 
across to Yemen.   
 
Recommendation 19 
It is recommended that the breeding programme be expanded, and 
computerised to optimise the selection of suitable parents.   
 
Recommendation 20 
It is recommended that if possible the guarded test area be expanded, to allow 
parts to “rest” and lose any contaminating smells.   
 
Recommendation 21 
It is recommended that alternative forms of targets such as TNT-contaminated 
cloth fragments be considered instead of mines in the unguarded search area, 
allowing them to remain indefinitely.   
 
Recommendation 22 
It is recommended that members of other teams, such as Survey or Quality 
Assurance teams, who could use dogs for their operations, also be given 
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10 Victim Assistance Programme 
 
1 The Yemeni Landmine/UXO Victim Assistance Programme was established in 
1999 as an integral part of the YEMAC operations, and is probably one of the most 
advanced in the world. Staff consists of a five member medical team under the 
dynamic directorship of Dr. Fouad Al Shamery, with assistance from a highly 
qualified nurse Tzvetanka Dermendjieva responsible for field missions and general 
coordinating and administrative tasks. In addition, there is four field staff located in 
Aden. Both genders are appropriately represented in the overall staffing picture. 
 
2 There are four distinct phases to the programme. 
 
(i)  Medical survey phase. Using data from the landmine impact survey, 
as incorporated into IMSMA, victims are identified and classified according to 
gender, age, location and medical needs. During this phase the medical team 
travels to the communities for interviews and medical examinations of victims, 
while identifying their socio-economic circumstances. The physical exam sheet 
provides personal details, medical and surgical history, extent and cause of 
trauma, medication, allergies and a general assessment including a treatment 
plan with special requirements and equipment requirements. During the survey 
stage, additional victims not identified in the LIS, or victims of other types of 
accidents, are included. The survey is usually conducted district by district lasting 
between 15 to 20 days. At the end of the survey, victims are classified on the 
basis of future medical assistance requirements. Each victim is assigned an ID 
number. 
 
(ii)  Medical examination phase. Victims requiring medical attention are 
collected from their villages by bus at pre-determined intervals and transported to 
a major hospital. The programme pays for transportation, accommodation, 
medical examination, medicine and (during the subsequent phase) all other 
required treatment. The victim assistance team arranges for necessary 
appointments in advance with various departments in the hospital depending on 
needs (e.g. eye, ear, surgical specialists) for an efficient examination process. 
Victims requiring prosthetic devices will visit Handicap International. At the end of 
the examinations, a list of required medical interventions is established in order to 
determine a comprehensive and individual medical support programme.  
 
(iii) Medical support phase. During this third phase, victims identified as 
requiring further support return to the hospital or the Handicap International 
Prosthetic Centre for treatment and stay there until their treatment is completed. 
Victims are provided with wheelchairs, eyeglasses, hearing aids, artificial limbs 
and other means that allow them to return to a more normal life. A ceremony is 
organized to present the rehabilitated victims to the public at large. The ceremony 
is attended by senior people from NMAC, YEMAC, UN and NGOs with the 
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objective of informing the public through TV and radio of the importance of mine 
action.            
 
Of considerable interest for this phase is the commitment by the Government of 
Italy to take up to five severely damaged victims per year and treat them in 
Tuscany in ways for which hospitals in Yemen are not yet ready, including 
cosmetic surgery. Under the agreement between the Government of Italy and the 
Government of Yemen, travel costs are paid by the latter and hospitalisation by 
the former. Thus far two victims have received this very costly, but very essential, 
treatment. In both cases, the outcome was most encouraging. This Italian 
contribution is not shown in the official donor statistics since funds are obtained 
from a special Italian regional budget. 
 
The VA section in YEMAC produces a wide range of statistics that provide an 
excellent summary of achievements. These detailed statistics are not 
incorporated into IMSMA at this time.4 From the beginning of the implementation 
of the programme, close to 1200 victims have been identified in 476 communities. 
Medical support that has been provided is shown in the following table. 
 
Support Provided (2001-Febr. 2005) 









Hospitalisation in Italy 











  Source: VA Section, YEMAC 
    
 
(iv) Rehabilitation phase. The last phase in the victim assistance 
programme deals with reintegration of victims into the community. The Yemen 
Association for Landmine / UXO Survivors was established in the fall of 2004 with 
the purpose of providing mutual support among victims. The goal of the 
Association is to provide landmine victims with skills that will allow them to 
become fully participating members in their communities. Operations started in 
January 2005. With initial financial assistance from the UNDP, the programme 
has subsequently been supported by the Government of Japan, which continues 
to be the major contributor. 
 
3 A visit to the training centre, located in Sana’a, revealed a very enthusiastic 
team of administrators, trainers and trainees, both male and female, all being victims, 
                                            
4 See chapter on IMSMA 
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engaged in training that currently focuses on computers, sewing and handicrafts. In a 
short period of time the centre has managed to train some 40 people, producing 
items of high quality (e.g. clothing, handicrafts), with good sales value. Trainees 
reside in the centre until they finish their programme. The centre is also active in 
finding them meaningful employment after completion of the programme and several 
of them have already returned to their villages to commence a new life. 
 
4 The Victim Assistance programme is unique in the world in terms of strategy, 
scope, effectiveness and final results. Success can be attributed to a combination of 
high-level Government support (including from the Health Ministry), qualified and 
dedicated staff, a well-defined strategic approach, and strong support by the YEMAC 
Programme Manager. It can serve as an example for other countries to examine, and 









3.1 Explosive imprinting describes the process of training odour discrimination in 
e initial training, the use of large targets such as anti-tank mines should be avoided. 
  
Case Study: Saba Ali Al-Jaradi 
 
In the year 2000, the mine exploded. Saba was 14 years old. Her father died during the explosion. She lost 
both legs and her eyesight. 
 
It was a normal day, a Monday, and there was no indication that her life would change forever. The minefield 
turned out to be very close to the hous . The children had been going to that area t usands of time, and 
nothing had happened before. Her father decided that he was going to build a new house and took his daughter 
to see the new location. Saba was walking close to him when the bomb exploded. Her father died almost 
instantly, blown away by the impact. She fell down, with serious damage to her face, and then discovered that 
her legs were missing.  
 
The Victim Assistance staff heard of her case, and arranged for her transportation to hospital. Her recovery 
was slow and traumatic. She stayed in hospital for almost a full year, received specialized artificial limbs, 
participated in physiotherapy, underwent surgery. In 2003 a final eye surgery took place giving her back part 
of her eyesight.  All expenses were paid by the VA programme. She was given training in sewing and 
currently lives in the training centre of the Association for Landmine Survivors, learning computer skills. She 
feels grateful:  
 
“I feel happy and relaxed here. I learned how to sew, how to work on a computer. I 
completed a specialized course for teachers. Now I am already a teacher in the centre. 
And best regards from me to Mr. Mansour [YEMAC Programme Manager]. Let him call 
more often!”  
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11 Mine Risk Education Programme  
 
1 Mine Risk Education has become an effective, high profile, activity of YEMAC 
with clear indications that its training programme has sensitised the population of the 
dangers of landmines. Thus far, of the 596 communities contaminated by landmines, 
266 have been covered by the programme as of the end of 2004. The programme is 
currently financed by the UNDP and the Government of Japan on a 50-50 basis.  
 
Mine Risk Education 
 
Year Men Women Total Number of 
Villages 
1999 0 0 0 0 
2000 0 0 0 0 
2001 24,500 12,000 36,500 24 
2002 141,000 86,000 227,000 85 
2003 38,332 36,648 74,980 76 
2004 52,880 57,960 110,840 81 
Total 256,712 192,608 449,320 266 
 
2 The unit is well staffed with three individuals at headquarters (the Chief of 
section, his deputy and an administrative assistant), and some ten members located 
in Aden for fieldwork. The programme also benefits from a close association with a 
local NGO, the Yemen Mine Awareness Association, which provides six field staff 
(four women and two men). In addition, six women volunteers have been trained and 
participate in educational activities. 
 
3 The programme itself seems well designed and involves officials at the highest 
Government levels as well as active roles for selected villagers. In the setting of 
priorities, activities are based on the operational strategies of YEMAC, focusing 
initially on high landmine / UXO impacted areas, then medium and low contaminated 
areas. Individual mission plans are drafted and approved at headquarters, relying on 
LIS data.  Once approved, the plans are forwarded to the Aden branch for 
preparatory activities and coordination. Of considerable interest is the workshop 
conducted at the opening of the district programme, attended by high Governmental 
officials for visibility, and extensively covered by the media. The educational 
programme for each village is geared to prevailing circumstances. It includes gender-
segregated activities and targets different groups (women, men, children). A 
programme for a single community normally involves a one-day period, and covers 
subjects such as types of landmines to be found, how to (not) deal with landmines / 
UXO, and how to report them. There are always one or two people targeted in a 
community (often male and female teachers) for onward training to ensure continuity. 
In all, MRE appears to be a highly effective and well-organized programme that can 
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4 Mine risk education programs follow a standard and logical pattern and consist 
of three phases: (i) pre-clearance MRE; (ii) MRE in association with the survey team 
and/or the demining team; and (iii) MRE after clearance. Individual files are opened 
for each village, and statistical progress is reported to IMSMA.5  
 
5 It is clear, and field observation confirms it, that Mine Risk Education in Yemen 
is mature and follows a well-designed strategy.  The programme is subject to an 
internal monitoring process as part of the internal management feedback system. It 
has been integrated into the overall work plan and objectives of mine action in 
Yemen. Of key importance for its success is the high profile given to the programme 
and the full support it receives from high Government officials. Better recording of 
progress details, however, will need to be considered. Basic MRE information is 
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12 Information Management 
 
 
1 The Information Management system currently used within YEMAC is based 
on the UN Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA), which is 
operational and effective in integrating information for mine action planning purposes. 
It is used frequently by management, and maps are of useful quality. Information is 
much in demand and can be accessed electronically by Government Departments, 
NGOs, companies and other users. 
 
2 The 1:100,000 GIS maps underlying the system were used during the original 
impact survey. This large scale is a cause of concern because of its limitations in the 
amount of terrain detail that may be available.  Another problem relates to the fact 
that the maps do not cover the country as a whole.  The set of maps currently in use 
should be completed. Ideally, current maps should be replaced with a complete 
countrywide set of digitised maps at a scale of 1:50,000 or less.  This will allow more 
detailed geo-referencing of satellite or aerial photography, and scanning in of other 
maps, because of the availability of accurate and identifiable points of reference. In 
order to decide on the best method of obtaining more detailed maps, a costing of 
alternative approaches should be carried out. 
 
3 While the system is capable of providing basic information that is required, it 
has not been sufficiently customized to allow the incorporation of details with respect 
to MRE and VA. Every form of IMSMA has 20 user-defined fields that would allow the 
recording of considerable detail of mine action activity. At the moment the VA section 
is compiling an interesting set of data on victims. These data do not appear in 
IMSMA. The result is that task-forcing sheets fail to offer data that could be of 
enhanced usefulness for management purposes. 
 
4 In general, there continues to be a serious constraint already mentioned in a 
review of activities and staffing for the period January – December 2004.6 In this 
document it is stated, “the cooperation between the IMSMA and Operation 
Departments is poor and needs to be improved and strengthened. The result of this 
is that the reports generated are inconsistent and not useful either for planning or 
monitoring/evaluation”.   
 
Recommendation 23 
It is recommended that a donor be sought who can supply digitised base maps 
covering the whole of the country at a minimum of 1:50,000 scales.  The US is 
likely to have such mapping.   
 
 
6  Yemen Executive Mine Action Centre, “Review Report on Activities and Staffing for the Period January-
December 2004, p.3 
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Recommendation 24 
It is also recommended that IMSMA be further customized to allow details of 
the MRE and VA programs to be incorporated.   
 
Recommendation 25 
It is recommended that cooperation between Operations and IMSMA be 
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13 Community Rehabilitation 
 
 
1 Mine Action consists of five pillars: stockpile destruction, advocacy, mine risk 
education, mine clearance, and victim assistance. In all five areas, Yemen compares 
very favourably to other mine action programs in the world.  
 
2 The Government takes its responsibilities very seriously indeed. The 
ratification of the AP MBC to Ban Landmines came into force on 1 September 1998, 
and Yemen became a party to the Convention on 1 March 1999. The destruction of 
the national stockpile of anti-personnel mines was completed in April 2002. Yemen 
completed the first UN Certified Landmine Impact Survey in August 2000, and 
developed a Five-Year Strategic Mine Action Plan (2001-2005) that was updated in 
June 2004. The strategy aims to put an end to the casualties and suffering of the 
people for a mine Impact free country by March 2009, with some “mopping up” 
activities left to be done by that date. In addition, as is mentioned elsewhere in this 
report, Mine Action benefits from legal endorsement, a strong management and 
overseeing structure involving the highest levels of government, and substantial 
annual financial contributions of GOY. The evolution of the components of Yemen’s 
mine action programme is nothing short of impressive. What is the next step in this 
march forward? 
 
3 The evaluation team pondered this question at length. It considered the 
ultimate purpose of mine action, i.e. the well being of the community. It realized that 
the five pillars are a mere prelude to this final goal. It realized that mine victims are 
not only individuals who lost a limb, but also the communities that lost a livelihood.  
 
4 The team became convinced that a sixth pillar needs to be recognized in mine 
action, i.e. community rehabilitation. This sixth pillar is not officially acknowledged by 
the mine action world as yet. Nevertheless, its logic is indisputable. It is an inevitable 
final step in mine action capacity development, and completes the programme. Mine 
action should be regarded as an integrated and comprehensive set of activities with 
the final task of rehabilitating the affected community.  
 
5 A chart has been prepared to illustrate this more comprehensive approach to 
capacity development (Annex 6). The chart shows the logic and the chain of 
responsibilities typical in building a viable mine action programme, with a project’s 
intermediate outcome the enhanced well-being of those affected. 
 
6 In discussing the concept of community rehabilitation with representatives of 
five donor countries in Yemen, the evaluation team found general support for such an 
initiative, although in one or two cases it was pointed out that the mixing of mine 
action budgets with development budgets might present problems for the 
bureaucracy at home.  
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7 The process of community rehabilitation could be envisaged as follows: 
 
1) It commences with the identification of community clusters where adjacent 
high-impact, medium impact and low-impact areas have been cleared thus 
providing a contiguous area for rehabilitative attention.7 
 
2) A socio-economic assessment is conducted with the purpose of identifying (i) 
improvements that have occurred since clearance; (ii) remaining obstacles to 
socio-economic development; and (iii) key initiatives that need to be taken to 
remove such obstacles and/or enhance socio-economic well being. 
 
3) On the basis of this assessment / pre-feasibility study, selected pilot projects 
are designed and costed. 
 
4) Selected project proposals are submitted to the Ministry of Planning in order to 
be inserted into the National Strategic Development Plan of Yemen. 
 
5) Other project proposals are submitted to prospective donors for possible 
funding and implementation. 
 
8 It is not suggested here to erect a massive bureaucracy within the mine action 
centre. On the contrary, mid-way through a mine action programme, when villagers 
have started to return to their land, the CTA will be able to re-direct his/her attention 
to the final steps required in a comprehensive programme. The CTA can now begin 
to focus on coordination tasks to conduct assessments, pre-feasibility studies, and 
pilot project designs in collaboration with expertise that can be found within ongoing 
development programs sponsored by the UNDP and bilateral donors.  
 
9 A community rehabilitation programme for post-clearance situations will have 
to be based on a well-designed strategic approach, identifying scope and design 
issues, as well as implementation and funding modalities. A CTA will need to train a 
strong counterpart who can ensure continuity when the CTA departs. One could 
envisage a small complement of staff within the Community Rehabilitation Unit. 
Cooperative arrangements with GOY, donors and the UNDP will need to be 
established. The CTA and his/her counterpart will need to be familiar not only with 
technical mine action issues, but also community development issues. 
 
Recommendation 26 
It is recommended that Community Rehabilitation become an integral part of 
mine action in Yemen, and be considered the last and essential sixth pillar in 
this particular programme.  
 
 
7 At the moment IMSMA indicates that clearance has been achieved in ten highly impacted communities, 52 
medium-impacted communities, and 38 low impacted communities. The cluster approach recently adopted by 
YEMAC to reduce costs, would appear to fit in well with community development planning.   
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Recommendation 27 
It is recommended that YEMAC establish a community rehabilitation planning 
and coordination competence that would become engaged in pilot 
assessments / pre-feasibility studies of selected village clusters, culminating in 
the design of pilot community-based initiatives.   
 
Recommendation 28 
It is recommended that the Community Rehabilitation Unit work in close 
collaboration with GOY, interested donors and the UNDP, with the intent of 
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14 Future UNDP-YEMAC Relationship 
 
 
1 The first phase of the MAP was managed by UNOPS. For the second phase it 
was decided to switch over to national execution. This meant, in essence, that the 
Government of Yemen would be fully responsible for managing all aspects of the 
operations. It implies, for example, that advisors, including the CTA, would now 
report to the national Programme Manager, and no longer to UNOPS. It also implies 
that the YEMAC has to assume significant responsibilities in terms of fund raising, 
that the definition of strategy and the execution of work fall upon the shoulders of the 
Government. It means that the maintenance of standards becomes a Government 
responsibility, etc. 
 
2 Given this move towards YEMAC away from dependency on external 
assistance, what role can, and should, the UNDP play in the future? Should an “exit 
strategy” be devised, and if so, what characteristics should such a strategy contain? 
 
3 The UNDP continues to play an important role, a role donors would not like to 
see relinquished. Of key importance here are UNDP’s activities in fund raising, 
procurement, and financial management. Discussing this matter with a number of 
donors, the evaluation team found unanimity with respect to the importance of UNDP 
involvement in these areas. The UNDP should remain the guardian of transparency. 
In addition, periodic monitoring/evaluation by an external agent was considered 
important, an area where the UNDP could play a useful role as well.8  
 
4 Aside from matters of transparency, it would seem that YEMAC management 
itself would also benefit from a close association with the UNDP. The provision of a 
CTA and the various tasks this person provides (in terms of assistance in strategy 
definition, preparation of budgetary summaries, progress reporting, analytical 
analyses, etc.) continues to be useful to YEMAC. The maintenance of internal 
financial controls to satisfy UNDP requirements results in a healthy internal financial 
discipline. The general confidence of the donor community as a result of an ongoing 
relationship with the UNDP would tend to facilitate fund raising efforts by GOY. 
Similarly, the support of the donor community would tend to strengthen the 
Programme Manager’s hand in dealing with his own government. 
 
5 In considering these arguments, the evaluation team felt that it is pre-mature 
to talk about an “exit strategy” for the UNDP.  
 
 
8 While an internal monitoring competence has been established successfully within the YEMAC, this service is 
designed to support day-to-day management only.  
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Lesson Learned 2 
The concept of National Execution does not automatically exclude support 




It is strongly recommended that UNDP continues support for mine action in 
Yemen following the end of their current Phase II support programme 
(YEM/03/010/01/99). 
 
6 Nevertheless, the universe evolves in its own inscrutable way. And so does 
YEMAC.  Systems are currently working, programs seem efficient and effective, 
operational autonomy is no longer a pious hope but a looming reality. What seems to 
be required at this time is an adjustment to the support the UNDP now provides. This 
adjustment is especially focused on the role of technical assistance. 
 
7 In the view of the evaluation team, technical assistance will no longer require 
two external specialists, but one only. In order to encourage the development of local 
expertise, the one remaining CTA should have a highly capable local counterpart 
who could, through on-the-job familiarization, take over when the CTA departs. This 
idea would accomplish two things: a reduction of external expertise from three in 
December 2004, to one in starting in May 20059; and the introduction of local 
capacity able to take over former advisory functions. 
 
8 The tasks of this CTA team would be focused on:  
 
(i) Traditional areas that would be of benefit to the Programme Manager (e.g. 
budgetary preparations, progress monitoring and reporting, strategic 
analyses); and 
 
(ii) Design and coordination of a community rehabilitation programme as a 
sixth pillar of mine action. (See previous chapter) 
 
Recommendation 30 
It is recommended that an advisory team be appointed consisting of one 
external CTA with a highly competent local counterpart, both of whom to be 
familiar not only with the technicalities of mine action but also community 




9 As of May 2005, the current CTA, Mr. Harald A. Wie, has resigned, leaving one technical expert in place, Mr. 
Faiz Mohammad, whose contract expires in August 2005. 
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15 Conclusions, Recommendations 





The mine action programme in Yemen is showing a depth of maturity that is 
comparable to the best mine action programmes in the world. Since the first 
convening of the high-level National Mine Action Committee in June 1998 and the 
establishment of the Yemeni Executive Mine Action Centre in January 1999, the 
programme has evolved in all directions, and shows results at the outcome level that 
reveal focus and clarity of purpose. The fundamental reason for the progress 
achieved is, without any doubt, the strong commitment of the Government. This 
commitment is not only revealed through the establishment of a legal, policy and 
management structure, but can also be judged from the substantial funds contributed 
from the national budget, amounting to some US$3.5 million annually.   
 
Under capable management, the YEMAC has established impressive MRE and VA 
programmes that can serve as examples to the rest of the world. There is a 
promising MDD programme, currently benefiting from training by Afghan specialists.  
National mine action standards are translated into Arabic, a comprehensive set of 
SOPs have been produced, including SOPs for quality assurance and monitoring. 
Operational concerns are of a relatively minor nature except for the existence of a 
large stockpile of munitions stored in a residential district of Aden awaiting sufficient 
explosives and demolition stores for destruction. Some training needs have been 
identified, especially for middle and senior management that might address the 
challenge of management succession. IMSMA fulfils a basic requirement, but some 
improvements in terms of accuracy and detail are necessary. 
 
The resource mobilization system seems to work well, and thus far no budgetary 
shortfalls have been experienced. The participation of the UNDP continues to be of 
importance particular in terms of fund raising, procurement and financial oversight. 
 
With a mature mine action programme that can serve, in many ways, as a model to 
the rest of the world, the question arises as to what should come next. The 
evaluation team has concluded that the next and final step in the mine action 
programme should recognize the rehabilitative needs of the affected communities, 
post clearance. To achieve the goal of community rehabilitation, the team proposes 
the incorporation of a core competence within the YEMAC to animate this activity, 
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The recommendations are based on the findings and opinions of the evaluation team  
In all cases they have been discussed with the staffs concerned, whether UNDP or 
YEMAC.   
 
Recommendations to UNDP10   
 
Recommendation 4 (page 11) – It is strongly recommended that UNDP assist in 
finding donors as a matter of urgency to donate sufficient explosive and demolition 
stores to destroy the dangerous stockpile of munitions in Aden, by detonation, a safer 
alternative to burning.   
 
Recommendation 7 (page 13) – It is recommended that UNDP assist in finding 
donors to fund the computerised system of stores and inventory management 
planned in the 2005 National Action Plan, and the training necessary for the logistic 
staff.  
 
Recommendation 14 (page 16) – It is recommended that UNDP assist in finding 
donors for the funding of computer equipment, projectors and training in Power Point, 
to be given to the instructors at the National Training Centre.   
 
Recommendation 16 (page 18) – It is recommended that quarterly updates on the 
overall YEMAC programme be prepared for distribution to stakeholders.  
 
Recommendation 23 (page 27) – It is recommended that a donor be sought by 
UNDP and YEMAC who can supply digitised base maps covering the whole of the 
country at a minimum of 1:50,000 scales.  The US is likely to have such mapping.   
 
Recommendation 29 (page 33) – It is strongly recommended that UNDP continues 
support for mine action in Yemen following the end of their current Phase II support 
programme (YEM/03/010/01/99). 
 
Recommendation 30 (page 33) – It is recommended that an advisory team be 
appointed consisting of one external CTA with a highly competent local counterpart, 
both of whom to be familiar not only with the technicalities of mine action but also 
community development. 
 
Recommendations to YEMAC 
 
Recommendation 2 (page 11) – It is recommended that the plan to convert two 
clearance teams to Technical Survey be implemented as soon as possible. 
 
Recommendation 3 (page 11) – It is recommended that enquires be made to 
explore the possibility of reducing the munitions stock by open burning techniques.   
                                            
10 As UNDP plays a supporting role to Yemen’s mine action programme, all recommendations addressed to 
UNDP also require agreement and complementary action by the government and/or YEMAC. 
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Recommendation 4 (page 11) – It is also strongly recommended that donors be 
requested as a matter of urgency to donate sufficient explosive and demolition stores 
to destroy this dangerous stockpile by detonation, a safer alternative to burning.   
 
Recommendation 5 (page 12) – Since there are three teams in a Company, it is 
recommended that team leaders perform QA sampling on each other’s teams rather 
than on their own, which can add to the thoroughness of the sampling process. 
 
Recommendation 6 (page 12) – It is recommended that Company Commanders, 
Team Leaders and members of YEMAC and the National Training Centre be 
encouraged to use internet for educational purposes. The Programme Manager is 
introducing a pilot scheme to investigate the practicability of doing so. 
 
Recommendation 9 (page 14) – It is recommended that a 3-day mine action 
refresher-training course be designed and put into use after every leave period. 
 
Recommendation 10 (page 15) – Where staff is recruited direct from the Army, 
refresher training, and a reasonable period in the field, are highly recommended.   
 
Recommendation 11 (page 15) – It is also recommended that administrative and 
logistics staff members spend a short attachment in the field, to ensure that they 
understand the problems at field level.   
 
Recommendation 13 (page 15) – It is recommended that middle and senior 
managers be given instruction in English, so they can benefit more from training 
material and other information produced in that language. 
 
Recommendation 15 (page 16) – It is recommended that trainers be periodically 
rotated into field positions as Team Leaders or Supervisors in field companies, 
quality control or survey teams, to allow them to gain valuable feedback from the 
operations.  This will give them a better idea of areas where current training may be 
insufficient. 
 
Recommendation 17 (page 19) – It is recommended that a system of periodic field 
verification checks by YEMAC’s finance officer be introduced.  
 
Recommendation 18 (page 21) – It is recommended that a senior instructor from 
the Afghan MDD programme remain with the Yemeni dog programme, to allow 
improvements to be passed across to Yemen.   
 
Recommendation 19 (page 21) – It is recommended that the dog breeding 
programme be expanded, and computerised to optimise the selection of suitable 
parents.   
 
Recommendation 20 (page 21) – It is recommended that if possible the guarded 
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Recommendation 21 (page 21) – It is recommended that alternative forms of 
targets such as TNT-contaminated cloth fragments be considered instead of mines in 
the unguarded search area, allowing them to remain indefinitely.   
 
Recommendation 22 (page 21) – It is recommended that members of other teams, 
such as Survey or Quality Assurance teams, who could use dogs for their operations, 
also be given training in mine dog operations, to understand the strengths and 
limitations of MDD. 
 
Recommendation 25 (page 28) – It is recommended that cooperation between 
Operations and IMSMA be improved in order to enhance the accuracy and reliability 
of IMSMA output. 
 
Recommendation 26 (page 30) – It is recommended that Community Rehabilitation 
become an integral part of the mine action programme in Yemen, and be considered 
the last and essential sixth pillar.   
 
Recommendation 27 (page 31) – It is recommended that YEMAC establish a 
community rehabilitation planning and coordination competence that would become 
engaged in pilot assessments / pre-feasibility studies of selected village clusters, 
culminating in the design of pilot community-based initiatives.   
 
Recommendation 28 (page 31) – It is recommended that a Community 
Rehabilitation Unit work in close collaboration with GOY, interested donors and the 
UNDP, with the intent of defining implementation and funding modalities.  
 
Recommendations to GICHD and Others 
 
Recommendation 1 (page 9) – It is recommended that the Yemeni National Mine 
Action Standards be retained in the GICHD for use as a working example for other 
Arabic-speaking national programmes.   
 
Recommendation 8 (page 13) – It is also recommended that the German Foreign 
Ministry be asked to supply medicines for the paramedics, at a cost of €12,000 per 
year. 
 
Recommendation 12 (page 15) – It is recommended that Cranfield University be 
asked to conduct their next regional middle management course in Arabic, and give 
priority to Yemeni candidates.   
 
Recommendation 24 (page 28) – It is also recommended that IMSMA be further 
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XLesson Learned 1X (page X8X) – The success of Yemen’s mine action programme is 
largely due to the very strong commitment coming from the highest levels of 
Government, translated into a powerful decision-making structure and competent 
management. 
 
XXLesson Learned 2X (page X33X) – The concept of National Execution does not 
automatically exclude support from the UNDP. In fact, the latter needs to continue to 
play a vital role in Yemeni mine action. 
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Annex 1.  Terms of Reference 
 
 
Terms of Reference for a ‘mid-term’ Outcome Evaluation for 





• UNational Context 
 
During the past 30 years, from the revolution to the period of civil confrontation in 1994, 
Yemen has witnessed a number of conflicts, each leaving behind a significant level of mine 
and UXO problem. In 2000, a Landmine Impact Survey (LIS) was carried out in Yemen. The 
survey provided vital data and information about the landmine and UXO impact on the 
Yemeni communities. A total of 592 communities were identified to be impacted by 
landmines and UXOs, out of which 14 communities, with a population of 36,000 were found 
to be highly impacted, while medium or low impact was reported in 578 communities with a 
population of 791,400.  
 
Human suffering and economic losses due to landmines and UXOs in Yemen are believed to 
be significant. Although the total number of mine/UXO casualties is not precisely known, the 
LIS reports indicate the number of mine and UXOs casualties to be as high as 5000 over the 
past 10 years, with 200 casualties over the past two years alone. A large number of 
casualties are believed to be women and children, while farming and grazing are the main 
activities affected by landmines. Blocking agricultural lands, irrigation sources and grazing 
areas can be of significant economic losses on both national and local levels as only 2.6% of 
the total land area is arable. It is therefore expected that economic pressure may force some 
of the local communities to enter mined areas, risking their lives in order to gain some land 
for agricultural activities or for tending domestic animals. 
 
The Government of the Republic of Yemen is committed to eliminate the impact of mines and 
UXOs in Yemen. Realizing that the mine and UXO problem cannot be solved unless an 
integrated mine action initiative is launched, the Yemen National Mine Action Committee 
(NMAC) was established in June 1998 to provide policy level support and act as steering 
body for mine action activities in the country. Furthermore, the Yemen Executive Mine Action 
Centre (YEMAC) was established in January 1999 as a national mine action implementing 
body. Since the establishment of these bodies, the Government of Yemen has been 
spending approximately three million dollars annually from its own budget in support of mine 
action activities nation wide.  
 
All these developments have demonstrated the strong commitment of the Government of the 
Republic of Yemen to eliminate the landmine problem in Yemen. Such commitment on the 
part of the government has also been a key element in promoting donors confidence in the 
Yemen Mine Action Programme (YMAP).  
 
The Republic of Yemen was the first country in the region to ratify to Ottawa Treaty to Ban 
Landmines. The ratification was received by the United Nations on 1 September 1998 and 
Yemen accordingly became a party to the Convention on 1 March 1999.  
 
• U NDP Support Project – Phase I 
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The UNDP Mine Action Support Project YEM/98/002 phase one was officially launched in 
1999. The project mainly focused on developing a sustainable national capacity to effectively 
address the mine problem in the country. Phase I ended in September 2003. The 
achievements have been very satisfactory. During Phase I, the project in collaboration with 
NMAC throughand its implementing body YEMACYEMAC has significantly contributed to 
enabling the Yemen Mine Action Programme achieve: 
  
• Completion of the first UN Certified Landmine Impact Survey 
 
• Developing a Five-Year Strategic Mine Action Plan (2001-2005) and successfully 
achieving the target set for the 2001and 2002. 
 
• Training and the creation of seven Mine Clearance Units, seven Technical Survey 
Teams, and three Quality Assurance Teams, with a total manpower of more than 800 
personnel.  
 
• Clearance of six highly mine impacted communities, out of a total of 14 highly 
impacted communities. 
 
• Conducting Mine Awareness in all 14 most-affected communities, and expansion of a 
comprehensive mine victim assistance programme. 
 
• Yemen’s full compliance with Ottawa Treaty obligations, and the destruction of 
national stockpile of anti-personnel landmines took place in April 2002R .  
 
• UPrevious evaluations/assessments: 
 
An evaluation of the YMAP was carried out in October 2001. The findings of the evaluation 
were encouraging. It mainly concluded that the programme is a well-founded programme 
enjoying full Government support and effective management. The programme successfully 
achieved the objectives of the first year of the Five Year Strategic Mine Action Plan. The 
evaluation identified certain areas for improvement, mainly improving the safety and 
productivity of the mine action activities and suggested a more decentralized management 
structure for the Programme.  
 
Additionally, an assessment mission from the UNDP Mine Action Team (MAT), New York, 
visited the programme in October 2002 to assess the status of the programme and to provide 
recommendations on future strategy for UNDP support to mine action in Yemen. The mission 
identified certain strengths of the programme and highlighted opportunities for improvement. 
Government commitment, a well integrated approach, good donors support and a well-
established technical capacity were highlighted as the main strengths of the Programme. 
However, in order to ensure sustainability of the Programme in the long run, the following 
areas were identified as requiring improvement and strengthening and will remain the main 
focus of the UNDP capacity building efforts during the second phase of the Project: 
 
• Develop a more effective management structure, reasonably decentralised, to ensure 
responsiveness to the operational needs and long term sustainability requirements. 
 
• Develop a more competent management capacity, especially at the middle 
management level. 
 
• Improve the Quality Assurance (QA) system 
 





  42  
 
             
 
• Effective usage of International Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA) 
 
 
Based on the recommendations from the MAT, New York the Programme Document was 
revised and approved in June 2003. The UNDP Mine Action Support Project was turned in to 
National Execution (NEX) in October 2003, which also started Phase II (2003 – 2006).  
 
• U NDP Support Project – Phase II 
 
The main objectives of this second phase are: 1) To further strengthen and develop 
management and technical capacity of the Yemen Mine Action Programme (YMAP); 2) To 
improve the safety of the mine affected communities by reducing the landmine threat through 
the implementation of an integrated programme; 3) To contribute to the Yemeni economy by 
safely returning additional mine free land to Yemeni communities for productive use; 4) To 
meet the needs of the mine victims and develop strategies for their socio-economic 
reintegration; and 5) To further improve the Mine Risk Education to reduce accidents and 
causalities casualties among Yemeni citizens through massive awareness campaigns. 
 
According to the evaluation plan of UNDP Yemen, a mid-term evaluation will be conducted in 
the fourth quarter of 2004. 
 
The following intended outcome is to be evaluated: 
 
1. Capacity strengthening 
 
1.1 National Mine Action Standards (NMAS) for Yemen based on the principles and within 
the framework of the International Mine Action Standards (IMAS) developed and introduced.  
1.2 An effective Quality Assurance (QA) system based on the Total Quality Management 
(TQM) concept developed. 
1.3 A proper finance department within YEMAC established and a finance, logistic and admin 
manual compatible with the UNDP requirements and national rules and regulations 
developed. 
1.4 Training Manuals to ensure all aspects of operations are covered and any changes in the 
procedures/drills are incorporated updated. 
1.5 Equipment test and trial capacity within YEMAC developed. 
1.6 An effective Management Information System (MIS) developed. 
1.7 Mine Action Management Training at both senior and middle levels delivered. 
1.8 A Regular Revision Training system for the YEMAP Operations staff developed. 
1.9 Special training packages to upgrade the technical and professional skills of the YEMAP 
training staff to ensure better training for the YEMAP personnel developed.  
1.10 Sustainable Explosives Detection Dogs (EDD) capacity including in-country breeding 
facility established.  
1.11 Resource Mobilization Capacity within YEMAC and NMAC developed. 
 
2. Field operations 
 
2.1 Within the YMEAC Strategic Mine Action Plan, 45.7 square kilometers of mine and UXO 
contaminated areas technically surveyed and cleared from mines and UXOs. By doing so, all 
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2.2 At least seventy-two Mine Affected Communities trained on direct Mine Risk Education. 
 
3. Mine Victim Assistance 
 
3.1 2380 mine victims reported in 488 communities (in the Level One Impact Survey) visited 
and necessary medical treatment provided. 
 
• UPartnership Strategy 
 
UNDP in collaboration with the Government of Yemen will seek to ensure coherent and 
effective cooperation with other donors who share the common mission of promoting 
integrated humanitarian mine action activities. The programme will also form or strengthen 
partnerships with national, regional and international organizations with expertise in areas 
related to humanitarian demining and institutional building.   
 
The network established during the first phase of the Programme (1999-2003) with 
international donors, local and international NGOs, UNMAS, and UNOPS will be further 
strengthened and efforts will be undertaken to mobilize additional resources from regional 
Funds and global Thematic Trust Funds (TTF).  
 
Furthermore, the project in collaboration with UNDP and the Government of Yemen will 
explore resource mobilization and partnership opportunities with currently contributing donor 
countries (10 donors) and other potential donors such as the Nordic countries as well as the 
European Commission (EU). It will also develop relations with countries having similar mine 
and UXO problems through the UNDP Mine Action Exchange Programme (MAX). 
 
B. OBJECTIVES OF THE EVALUATION 
 
The outcome evaluation shall assess the following: (i) outcome analysis - what and how 
much progress has been made towards the achievement of the outcome (including 
contributing factors and constraints), (ii) output analysis - the relevance of and progress 
made in terms of the UNDP outputs (including an analysis of both project activities and soft-
assistance activitiesTPF11FPT), and (iii) output-outcome link - what contribution UNDP has made/is 
making to the progress towards the achievement of the outcome (including an analysis of the 
partnership strategy).  
 
 
C. SCOPE OF THE EVALUATION 
 
This outcome evaluation will be looking at the relevance and contribution of UNDP project 
activities with regard to the outcome. Specifically, the outcome evaluation is expected to 
address the following issues: 
 
U1. Outcome analysis 
 
 What are the current situation and possible trend in the near future with regard to the 
outcome? 
 Whether has sufficient progress been achieved vis-à-vis the outcome as measured by the 
outcome indicator? 
 What are the main factors (positive and negative) that affect the achievement of the 
outcome? 
                                            
TP
11
PT For UNDP, soft assistance activities include advocacy, policy advice/dialogue, and facilitation/brokerage of 
information and partnerships. 
 
 
  44  
 




U2. Output analysis 
 
 Are the UNDP outputs still relevant to the outcome? 
 Has sufficient progress been made in relation to the UNDP outputs? 




D. PRODUCTS EXPECTED FROM THE EVALUATION 
 
The key product expected from this outcome evaluation is a comprehensive analytical report 
in English that should, at least, include the following contents: 
 
 Executive summary 
 Introduction 
 Description of the evaluation methodology 
 An analysis of the situation with regard to the outcome, the outputs and the partnership 
strategy; 
 Key findings (including best practice and lessons learned) 
 Conclusions and recommendations 
 
 
E. EVALUATION CONSULTANT 
 
An international consultant will be contracted to perform the evaluation. The consultant 
should have the proven knowledge and relevant work experience in the field of mine action, 
sound knowledge about results-based management (especially results-oriented monitoring 
and evaluation). The consultant will take the overall responsibility for the quality of the 
evaluation report. 
 
Specifically, the Consultant will perform the following tasks: 
 
 Design the detailed evaluation scope and methodology  
 Review documents and make field visits if necessary 
 Meet with relevant government and development community counterparts 
 Conduct an analysis of the outcome and outputs (as per the scope of the evaluation 
described above); 
 Draft and Finalize the evaluation report 
 
 
F. EVALUATION TIMEFRAME 
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Strengthening National Capacity for Mine Action in Yemen – Phase II 
 
Key Objectives – Phase II Intended Output Possible Indicators 
 
(1)Strengthening management 
and technical capacity of 
YMAP 
 
(1.1) Organizational structure 
of YEMAC clearly designed 









(1.2) Introduction of National 














(1.3) Effective Quality 













(1.4) Establishment of proper 






- Structure adequate to address all 
key components of mine action 
programme. 
 
- Staff in place for all key tasks. 
 
- Degree of staff competence 




- Stage of development of NMAS. 
 
- Approval of developed NMAS by 
NMAC. 
 
- Training manuals prepared. 
 
- Extent and effectiveness of 
NMAS training for YEMAP 
personnel. 
 
- Extent and quality of NMAS 
introduction in YMAP operations 
 
 
- Preparation of SOPs for all 
functions. 
 
- Approval of SOPs by NMAC. 
 
- Training manuals completed 
 
- Effective SOP training provided 
on ongoing basis. 
 




- Adequate staff in place properly 
trained. 
 
- Updated financial procedures and 
administration manuals available 
 
 
  46  
 











(1.5) Equipment test and trial 
capacity developed in 
YEMAC. 
 





















(1.8) Mine Action Training 










(1.9) Staff training system for 











and applied  / computerized.  
 
- Financial planning capability 
established, identifying future  
resource requirements. 
 




- Routine equipment tests are 
conducted by YEMAC. 
 
 
- Manual system functioning 
 




- Degree of functionality of IMSMA 
for survey and clearance data and 
basic reports 
 
- Progress in development of 
IMSMA for other functions . 
 
- Staff training in IMSMA provided 
and ongoing. 
 
- Results of staff training in IMSMA 
and effect on operations. 
 
 
- Method of identification of training 
needs. 
 
- Relevance of training packages. 
 
- Quality and frequency of training 
provided.  
 
- Training results. 
 
 
- Proper system to identify 
operational training needs in place. 
 
Relevance of training packages. 
 
- Training manuals / modules 
prepared. 
 
- Quality and frequency of training. 
 
- Results of training 
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(1.10) Training of Trainers 








(1.11) Mine Detection Dogs 





















(1.12) Resource mobilization 
capacity within YEMAC and 
NMAC developed. 
 
(1.13) Strategic planning 









- Quality of trainers available 
 
- System to enhance quality of 
trainers in place 
 
- Special training packages 
developed for instructors 
 
 
- Clearly formulated MDD capacity 
development plan in place. 
 
- Sufficient and trained national 
staff of the MDDC.  
 
- On-going dog training 
programme in place and being 
implemented 
 
- Refresher training of MDDs and 
handlers in place and being 
implemented. 
 
- Dog breeding programme in 
place. 
 
- Clear progress towards MDD 




- Resource mobilization system in 
place and functional. 
 
 






(2) Implementation of an 
integrated programme 
 
(2.1) Restructuring clearance 
resources and increasing TS 








(2.2) Mine/UXO free land 
returned to communities 
 
- Number and quality of demining 
units. 
 
- Number and quality of survey 
teams. 
 




- Contaminated areas surveyed 
and cleared from mines and UXO.  
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(2.4) Adequate reporting 










- People/communities returned to 
their land. 
 




Nature and effectiveness of 
achievements with respect to: 
 
- Medical survey process 
 
- Medical examination 
process 
 
- Medical support 
programme 
 
-  Rehabilitation phase 
____________________________
 
 - Quality and efficiency of 
reporting system. 
 
- Role of monitoring and evaluation 
 
 
- Quality of operational planning 
and coordination. 
 
- Effectiveness of Mine Risk 
Education programmes.  
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Annex 3.  List of People Interviewed 
 
GOY Government  Kasem Ahmed Al-Agam Minister of State 
 
UNDP    Flavia Pansieri  Resident Representative 
    Moin Karim   Deputy Res Rep (programmes) 
    Jamal Jarallah Jabwah Programme Analyst 
    Harald Wie   CTA Mine Action Programme 
    Faiz Mohammad  Adviser, Training 
    Walid Baharoon  Policy Analyst 
    Jamil Khan   Security Adviser 
 
YEMAC   Mansour M. Al Azi  Programme Manager 
    Mohammad Al Amrani Deputy Director Operations 
    Dr Fuad D. Al-Shamery Head, VA 
    Mabil Rassam  Head, MRE 
    Ahmed Y. Alawi  IMSMA manager 
    Mohammad Al Himyari Director of Logistics 
    Tzvetanka Dermendjieva Field Coordinator, VA 
    Ali S. Alzogarey  Head of Operations 
    Enaz Al-Arashi  Finance Officer 
    Ahmed Al-Khader  Head, MDD  
    Ali Alazi   Head,Monitoring and Evaluation 
    Dr. Abubaker M. Abbass Head, Medical Unit 
     
Aden Regional Office 
    Fadel Gharamah  Director 
    Nabeil Alghassaly  Deputy Director 
    Gaid Haithm   Operations Director 
    Abdul Aleah   7 Company Commander 
    Salah Abdullah Omer Training Manager 
    Qaid Saleh   Team Leader QA 
     
Embassies   Hisatsugu Shimizu, Counsellor, Japanese Embassy 
  Janet Alberda, First Secretary, Dutch Embassy 
Frank M. Mann, Ambassador, German Embassy 
    Dr. Stephan Buchwald, Counsellor, German Embassy 
    Michael Gifford, Ambassador, British Embassy 
    Gacomo Sanfleci, Ambassador, Italian Embassy 
 
Other    Saleh Al Dahyani, Director, Assoc. for Landmines/UXO  
    Mohamed A. Ahmed, Regional Coordinator, IMSMA
 
 
     
 
Annex 4.  Overall Financial Summary 
 
UOverall Financial Summary of the Mine Action ProjectU  
         U09.Apr.05U 
          
 Actual Expenditures Estimated 
Expenditures 
   
Donor 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 Total 
UNDP 16,988 404,785 171,133 172,564 202,504 124,555 263,000  1,355,529
Yemen     91,682 100,000 208,538 100,000 500,220
Netherlands    340,279 135,431 520,000   995,710
Italy    169,816 538,292 237,530 190,840  1,136,478
UK   159,815 202,903 41,263 333,284   737,265
Germany  50,153 119,220 134,663 119,384 620,000 343,650  1,387,070
Japan  214,582 38,782 75,808 10,120 300,000 136,616  775,908
USA  120,364 135,826 13,126 20,684    290,000
Norway  90,595 121,655 35,930 26,512    274,692
Canada   54,695 17,884 24,286 122,122 110,000 110,000 438,987
Sweden   47,427      47,427
Belgium       330,250 330,250 660,500
Total Contributions 16,988 880,479 848,553 1,162,973 1,210,158 2,357,491 1,582,894 540,250 8,599,786
          
Requirement*       3,500,000 2,500,000 11,850,000
          
To Be Mobilized       1,917,106 1,959,750 9,726,856
          
* Programme Requirement in accordance with the five-year National Strategic Mine Action Plan for Yemen (2005-2009).  




     
 
Annex 5.  Estimated Financial Contribution by GOY, FY 2004 
 
Yemen National Mine Action Programme 
Estimated Financial Contribution by the Government of Yemen, FY 2004 
        
No Particular Units Unit Cost  Total in YR Total in US$   
1 Salary 1050 21,500 YR 270,900,000 $1,472,282.61   
2 Allowances 1050 600 YR 226,800,000 $1,232,608.70   
3 Incentive 1050  5,500 YR 11,550,000 $62,771.74   
4 Uniform 1050 12,000 YR 12,600,000 $68,478.26   
5 Food 1050 1,000 YR 12,600,000 $68,478.26   
6 International Travel       
 DSA 3  200 US$ 6,624,000 $36,000.00   
 Air Tickets 3 1,000 YS$ 6,624,000 $36,000.00   
7 National Travel DSA 10 3,500 US$ 12,600,000 $68,478.26   
8 Rent of Facilities 6  32,016,000 $174,000.00   
9 Contribution to 
UNDP 
1 100,000 US$  18,400,000 $100,000.00   
10 Sundries at NMAC 1 100,000 US$ 18,400,000 $100,000.00   
11 Overhead 1 2% 69,750 $68,381.96   
12        
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